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ARGUMENT
I.

THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE
DEMONSTRATES
THAT THE ARBITRATOR
EXCEEDED
THE
AUTHORITY EXPLICITLY GRANTED TO HIM BY THE PARTIES AND
THUS THE ARBITRATOR LACKED JURISDICTION TO RULE ON
ISSUES CONCERNING PLAT B.

In the Brief of Appellee, Orton argues that "the Plat B issues
were properly submitted to the arbitrator."

Both the plain language

of the Agreement to Arbitrate and Utah case law indicate otherwise.
"It

is

of

course

fundamental

that

the

authority

arbitrator springs from the agreement to arbitrate."
Inc.

v. Botany

Indus.,

Inc.,

Swift

of

the
Indus.,

466 F.2d 1125, 1131 (3rd Cir. 1972);
5

see

also

Buzas

949

(Utah

Baseball,
1996)

Inc.

v.

(stating

Salt
that

Lake
"to

Trappers,
find

Inc.,

that

925 P.2d 941,

an arbitrator

has

exceeded his authority, a court must review the submission agreement
and

determine

whether

the

arbitrator's

award

covers

contemplated by the submission agreement.").1

areas

Moreover,

not

"[t]he

powers of an arbitrator are defined by agreement of the parties:

the

question they submit both establishes and limits the arbitrator's
jurisdiction."

IVestern Elec.

Co. v.

Communications

Wkrs.

of Am. , 450

F.Supp. 876, 881 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (citations omitted); accord
Steelworkers

v. Warrior

& Gulf

Navigation

Co.,

United

363 U.S. 574, 582, 80

S.Ct. 1347, 1353 (1960) ("[A"rbitration is a matter of contract and
a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which
he has not agreed so to submit") ; United

Local

Union

Cir.

1989);

Groceries,

No.

7R v.

Retail

Safeway
Store

Stores,
Employees

Food

Inc.,
Union

and

Commercial

Workers,

889 F.2d 940, 946 (10th
Local

508 F.2d 500, 502-03 (10th Cir. 1975) .2

782

v.

Sav-On

Contrary to the

lr

The exceeding authority or powers ground is a statutory ground
for vacating an arbitration award.
See Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-31a14(c) and 78-31a-15(b).
2

In United Steelworkers
v. Enterprise
Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S.
593, 80 S.Ct. 1358 (1960), the United States Supreme Court emphasized
that
an arbitrator is confined to interpretation and
application
of
the
collective
bargaining
agreement; he does not sit to dispense his own
brand of industrial justice. He may of course
look for guidance from many sources, yet his
award is legitimate only so long as it draws its
essence
from
the
collective
bargaining
6

position asserted throughout the Brief of Appellee,

xx

[i]t is the

reviewing court's duty to determine whether the arbitrator has acted
within that jurisdiction."
In

a

recent

opinion

Id.
that

discusses

the

exceeding

the

arbitrator's authority ground for vacating an arbitrator's award, the

Utah Supreme Court, in Intermountain
R.R.

Co.,

Power Agency

v. Union

Pacific

961 P.2d 320 (Utah 1998), 3 stated the following:
We have clearly held under the above
statutory framework [i.e., the Utah Arbitration
Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-l, et seq.]
for
vacating an arbitration award that an arbitrator
exceeds his or her powers if the arbitrator
strays beyond the scope of the questions
submitted for arbitration by the parties.
See
Buzas Baseball,
925 P.2d at 949. The scope of

the parties' dispute as defined

in their

written

agreement
to arbitrate
establishes the scope of
the arbitrator's authority in resolving the
conflict.
Id.

at 323 (emphasis added).

The supreme court further stated that

"[a]n arbitration award purporting to resolve questions beyond that
jurisdictional boundary is not valid."

Id.

"For a court to find

that an arbitrator has exceeded his or her delegated authority, the

agreement. When the arbitrator's words manifest
an infidelity to this obligation, courts have no
choice but to refuse enforcement of the award.
Id.

at 597, 80 S.Ct. at 1361.
3

The Utah Supreme Court's opinion set forth in
Intermountain
Power Agency
v. Union Pacific
R.R.
Co., 961 P.2d 320 (Utah 1998),
which was issued July 7, 1998, is not cited in the Brief of Appellee.
7

court must determine that " x the arbitrator's award covers areas not
contemplated by the submission

agreement.'"

(Emphasis added).

In the instant case, the Agreement
drafted

Orton 7 s

by

legal

counsel,

to Arbitrate, which was

states

that

the

parties

''acknowledge that the issues relating to the above-referenced Plat B
of Riderwood Village have been resolved, and that, therefore, the

arbitration
which

relate

case."4
of

will

focus on the remaining

to Plat

issues

of the dispute,

those

C, thereby resolving all remaining issues in the

See R. 145, Agreement to Arbitrate, a true and correct copy

which

is

attached

as Addendum

A

to

the

Brief

of

Appellant

(emphasis added).

A.

THE ALLEGED MODIFICATION OF THE AGREEMENT TO
ARBITRATE CONCERNING ISSUES RELATING TO PLAT B,
AS UNILATERALLY CLAIMED BY ORTON, IS VOID AND
UNENFORCEABLE BECAUSE IT WAS NEITHER AGREED UPON
NOR EVIDENCED BY WRITTEN AGREEMENT.

Notwithstanding the fact that the Agreement to Arbitrate limited
the authority and jurisdiction of the arbitrator to those issues
involving only Plat C, Orton, in his Brief, argues that
Agreement to Arbitrate was modified by mutual consent."
Appellee, pp. 13-21.

"[t]he

See Brief of

Orton7s argument, however, is fatally flawed in

light of the plain language of the Agreement to Arbitrate, not to

4

At both page 14 and at the bottom of page 16 of the Brief of
Appellee, Orton admits that the Arbitration Agreement between the
parties, which Orton's legal counsel drafted, "ostensibly limits" the
arbitrator's authority or jurisdiction to ruling on issues relating
to Plat C only.
8

mention that the Utah Arbitration Act, as interpreted by the Utah
Supreme

Court,, requires

that

all

agreements

to arbitrate be

in

writing.
In the recent arbitration case of Jenkins

v.

Percival,

962 P. 2d

796 (Utah 1998), 5 the Utah Supreme Court stated the following:
We hold that an arbitration agreement must
be written to be enforceable under section 7831a-4.
Section 78-31a-3 provides that only
"written agreement[s] " to submit a claim to
arbitration
are
"valid,
enforceable,
and
irrevocable."
The logical extension of this
language is that until an agreement to arbitrate
is
reduced
to
writing,
it
is
invalid,
unenforceable, and revocable.6
Id.

at 800 (brackets included); accord

Russell

v. World

Famous,

Inc.,

767 P.2d 456, 457 n.3 (Or. Ct. App. 1989) ("Agreements to arbitrate
must be in writing"); Coast
Co.,

Trading

Co.,

681 F.2d 1195, 1197 (9th Cir. 1982).

Inc.

v.

Pacific

Molasses

The Utah Supreme Court

reasoned that "[b]y employing the language 'arbitration agreement' in
both the title to section 78-31a-3 and the body of § 78-31a-4(l), the
Legislature signaled a correlation between the two sections.

Thus,

mandating 'written agreement[s]' under section 78-31a-3 is tantamount

5

0rton failed to cite to or otherwise recognize the Utah Supreme
Court's opinion in Jenkins
v. Percival,
962 P.2d 796 (Utah 1998),
which was issued on July 10, 1998.
6

"Whether an arbitration agreement is enforceable is a question
of law, and therefore, the appellate court reviews the trial court's
determination, which in the instant case was a confirmation of the
arbitrator's award, for correctness. Jenkins
v. Percival,
962 P.2d
796, 798 (Utah 1998) .
9

to requiring a party to prove a written 'arbitration agreement' under
section 78-31a-4."

Id.

(brackets included and footnote omitted).

In the case at bar, the express language of the Agreement to
Arbitrate limits the jurisdiction and authority of the arbitrator to
determining only those issues relating to Plat C.

See

R. 145,

Agreement to Arbitrate, a true and correct copy of which is attached
as Addendum A to the Brief of Appellant.

Thus, it follows, that the

alleged modification concerning Plat B of the Agreement to Arbitrate,
being unwritten, is void and unenforceable.
Agency

v.

Union

Pacific

R.R.,

See

Intermountain

961 P.2d 320, 323

(Utah 1998)

Power
("The

scope of the parties' dispute as defined in their written agreement
to arbitrate establishes the scope of the arbitrator's authority in
resolving the conflict").
Orton argues that unilateral and unacknowledged correspondence
from his legal counsel to legal counsel for Pacific Development,
L.C., somehow establishes that the written Agreement to Arbitrate,
which was drafted by Orton's legal counsel, was modified to include
issues concerning Plat B.

See

Brief of Appellee, pp. 17-19.

A

closer review of the correspondence referenced by Orton in his Brief,
however, reveals the inaccuracy of Orton's position.
The letter, dated April 28, 1997, from Orton's legal counsel to
legal

counsel

for Pacific Development, L.C., which preceded the

Agreement to Arbitrate, stated the following:

10

I

also

understand

from

that

same

conversation that Plat B was essentially

at

a

break even, and the amounts owing are on Plat C.
I understand that to mean that the signed and
unsigned change orders on Plat B are no longer

contested, and that the only contested
issues
relate
to the unsigned change orders on Plat C.
See

R. 213-19, Letter from Orton's legal counsel to counsel for

Pacific Development, L.C., dated April 28, 1997, p. 1, %2 (emphasis
added).

The language of the above-referenced letter indicates that

"Plat B was essentially at a break even", and that "the amounts owing
[were] on Plat C."

Shortly thereafter, the parties executed the

Agreement to Arbitrate, which, consistent with the language of the
April

28,

1997,

letter,

limits

the

scope

of

the

authority to resolve issues relating only to Plat C.

arbitrator's
The fact that

matters on Plat B were resolved and were at a "break even" point, is
further confirmed by the second letter referenced by Orton, which is
dated June 11, 1997, two days after the Agreement to Arbitrate was
executed by the parties.

In the June 11, 1997, letter, Orton's legal

counsel clarified why the issues relating to Plat B were resolved.
Orton's counsel stated the following:
At one point, Otto claimed to have overpaid
Orton Excavation on Plat "B" by $46,771.90.
However, when all of the extras on Plat "B" are
included (signed change orders = $21,907.85;
unsigned change orders = $24,600.67; total =
$46,508.52), those come to within $263.38 of the
$46,771.90
that
Belvedere
claim
to
have
overpaid.
By agreeing to those extras and
changes on Plat "B," that eliminates
any

remaining

disputes

on Plat

11

"B."

See R. 209-11, Letter from Orton's legal counsel to counsel for
Pacific Development, L.C., dated June 11, 1997, p. 2, ^3 (emphasis
added).
Orton's assertion concerning the correspondence or letters from
his counsel is nullified because the letters were unacknowledged by
counsel

for Pacific

Development, L.C.

Further, other than the

limiting language of the Agreement to Arbitrate, Orton points to
nothing in terms of a writing between the parties to indicate the
assent of Pacific Development, L.C., that the issues to be resolved
by the arbitrator included Plat B.
Utah

Code

Ann.

memorializing

a

§

25-5-4

contract

(Supp.
within

See Jenkins,
1997)
the

962 P.2d at 800;

(providing

statute

of

that

frauds

"signed by the party to be charged with the agreement") and
v.

Walton,

of.

writing
must

be

Guinand

22 Utah 2d 196, 199-200, 450 P.2d 467, 469 (1969) (holding

that letter from party to be charged satisfied statute of frauds).

B.

NOTWITHSTANDING THE LANGUAGE IN THE AGREEMENT TO
ARBITRATE
THAT
LIMITED
THE
ARBITRATOR'S
AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTION TO RESOLVE ISSUES
RELATING ONLY TO PLAT C, PACIFIC DEVELOPMENT,
L.C.# OBJECTED THAT THE ARBITRATOR DID NOT HAVE
THE AUTHORITY OR JURISDICTION TO DETERMINE
ISSUES RELATING TO PLAT B.

Orton claims that Pacific Development, L.C., "at no time during
the

entire

arbitration"

objected

to

determining issues relating to Plat B.
and 20.

the

arbitrator

hearing

or

See Brief of Appellee, pp. 19

This claim is a misrepresentation or both the record and

12

proceedings.

Moreover,

in light

of

the plain

language

in the

Agreement to Arbitrate limiting the arbitrator's jurisdiction and
authority to resolve issues relating only to Plat C, even if Pacific
Development, L.C., did not object, such did not operate as a waiver.
Notwithstanding the jurisdictional limitation of the arbitrator
set forth in the Agreement to Arbitrate, during the course of the
arbitration proceedings, Orton, through counsel, presented evidence
on matters concerning both Plat B and Plat C.

In addition to the

evidence presented on Plat C, Pacific Development, L.C., presented
evidence to counter the claims of Orton relating to Plat B.
evinced by way of its written closing argument

As

submitted to the

arbitrator, the primary purpose of the submission of evidence by
Pacific Development, L.C., concerning Plat B was to establish the
course of dealing and expectation between the parties for comparison
of dealings between the parties on Plat C.

See R. 201-04, Closing

Argument submitted by Pacific Development, L.C., to the arbitrator.
Such a comparison was important for purposes of establishing during
the arbitration the breach by Orton Excavation of the implied duty of
good faith and fair dealing in the course of performing excavation
services and products on Plat C.

See R. 143, Final Arbitration

Award, 1f3.7

7

Orton Excavation contracted with Pacific Development, L.C., to
install culinary water, sanitary sewer, storm drain lines, and other
excavation related services, including imported fill material, on
Plats B and C. See Brief of Appellee, Statement of Fact No. 2. The
13

On

November

7,

Arbitration Award,

1997,

thereby

the

arbitrator

issued

inviting, by virtue of

nature, objections or comments concerning the award.
Interim Arbitration Award.

his

Interim

its temporary
See R. 187-92,

In that Interim Arbitration Award, the

arbitrator, in direct contravention to the plain language of the
parties'
involving

Agreement

to

Plat B.

Id.

Arbitrate,

proceeded

Thereafter,

to

Pacific

rule

on

issues

Development, L.C.,

objected to the interim award by filing a Motion for Reconsideration,
objecting that the arbitrator lacked jurisdiction and authority to
rule on Plat B issues and requesting that the arbitrator reconsider
its ruling in light of the well-established implied duty of good
faith and fair dealing that Orton breached in the course of using
over three times the amount of fill material reasonably and fairly
necessary

to

complete

Reconsideration).

Plat

C

(See

R.

181-85,

Motion

for

Shortly thereafter, Orton filed his Opposition to

the Motion for Reconsideration (See R. 177-80, Opposition to Motion
for Reconsideration).

On December 24, 1997, the arbitrator issued

his Final Arbitration Award, overruling the objections.

See R. 138,

Final Arbitration Award.
As demonstrated above, Pacific Development, L.C., contrary to
Orton's assertion, did in fact object to the arbitrator resolving

parties executed a subcontract for Plat B on April 20, 1994.
Id.
Thereafter, on October 10, 1994, the parties executed a subcontract
for Plat C.
Id.
14

issues related to Plat B.

Notwithstanding the detailed and written

objection by Pacific Development, L.C., to the scope of arbitrator's
authority,

"participation

in

an

arbitration

objection to the scope of the award."

Russell

does

not

v. World

161 P.2d 456, 457 (Or. Ct. App. 1989) (citing Gamble
208 Or. 480, 486-88, 302 P.2d 553 (1956)).

waive

Famous,

et

an
Inc.,

ux v.

Sukut,

The fact that a party

does not waive objection to the scope of an arbitrator's award by
participating

in

the

arbitration

is

consonant

with

the

well-

established legal principle that the confines of the arbitrator's
authority to resolve conflicts, as defined by the parties written
agreement, is jurisdictional
Agency

v. Union

arbitration

Pacific

award

R.R. ,

purporting

Elec.

Trappers,
Co.

(E.D.N.Y.

v.

Inc.,

to

resolve

(Utah 1998)

questions

Buzas

Power

beyond

Baseball,

Inc.

v.

("An
that
Salt

925 P.2d 941, 949 (Utah 1996) (citing Western

Communications

1978))

Intermountain

961 P.2d 320, 323

jurisdictional boundary is not valid");
Lake

See

in nature.

("It

Wkrs.

Of

Am.,

is the reviewing

450 F. Supp.

court's

duty

876, 881

[under the

exceeding authority test] to determine whether the arbitrator has
acted within that jurisdiction"); Leahy
Co.,

907 P.2d

697, 699

v.

Guaranty

(Colo. Ct. App. 1995)

National

("The

Ins.

scope of an

arbitration panel's jurisdiction depends upon the issues actually
submitted

to it for determination

arbitration"); Executone

Infoimation

in the parties' proposals
Systems,

Inc.

v.

Davis,

for

26 F.3d

1314, 1323 (5th Cir. 1994) ("It is well-settled that the arbitrator's
15

jurisdiction

is

defined

by

both

the

contract

containing

arbitration clause and the submission agreement"); Coast
Inc.

v.

Pacific

Molasses

Orton's

argument

Co.,

the

Trading

Co.,

681 F.2d 1195, 1197 (9th Cir. 1982).

concerning

both

the

modification

of

the

Agreement to Arbitrate and waiver are further undermined by the fact
Matteson

that "arbitration is a creature of contract."
System

Inc.,

99 F.3d 108, 114 (3rd Cir. 1996).

v.

Ryder

As in contract law,

the touchstone for interpreting an agreement to arbitrate must be the
intention of the parties.
(citing Turner
1226

(Utah

v. Hi-Country
1996))

interpretation

("We

See Intermountain
Homeowners
have

Power,

Ass'n,

clearly

961 P.2d at 325

910 P.2d 1223, 1225,
held

that

of a contract, the parties' intentions

x

[i]n

the

should be

determined from the words of the Agreement") . Hence, the arbitrator
should deduce the parties' contractual intent as to the scope of
authority for resolving conflicts from the language of the Agreement.
Id.

After all, Mi]t is the parties, not the arbitrator, who decide

the issues submitted . . . ."
Intermountain

Power,

961

P.2d

Matteson,
at

323

99 F.3d at 114; see
("An

arbitration

also
award

purporting to resolve questions beyond that jurisdictional boundary
the written agreement to arbitrate] is not valid"). 8

[i.e.,

8

At page 23 of the Brief of Appellee, Orton claims that the
subcontract agreement between the parties "required all disputes to
be submitted to arbitration."
Orton's argument is in direct
contravention to the plain language of the Agreement to Arbitrate, as
executed by the parties, expressly limiting the arbitrator's
authority and jurisdiction to resolve issues related to Plat C only.
16

II •

BOTH THE INTERIM ARBITRATION AWARD AND THE FINAL
ARBITRATION AWARD OF THE ARBITRATOR DEMONSTRATE THAT
THE
HE
MANIFESTLY
DISREGARDED
WELL-ESTABLISHED
CONTRACT LAW CONCERNING BOTH THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF
GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING AND THE PROHIBITION OF
ADDING TERMS TO A CONTRACT THAT THE PARTIES OMITTED.

Orton, at page 2 6 of his Brief, erroneously asserts that "the
'manifest disregard of the law" argument [sic] is not even adopted in

Utah."

In Buzas Baseball,

Inc.

v. Salt

Lake Trappers,

Inc.,

925 P.2d

941 (Utah 1996), the Utah Supreme Court, in the course of analyzing
the manifest disregard ground due to it being raised on appeal and
relied upon by the trial court below, expressly reserved the issue of
whether this ground
Baseball

is recognized

in Utah inasmuch as the

case was decided on other grounds.

Id.

Buzas

at 951 n.8, 949.

Thus, this issue is a matter of first impression directly before this
Court.9
The manifest disregard of the law ground for overturning an
arbitration award is a judicially created doctrine that stems from
the exceeding authority statutory ground.10

Buzas

Baseball,

Inc.

v.

Moreover, the record indicates that the parties agreed to submit the
matter to arbitration rather than being compelled by language of the
subcontract agreement to do so.
See R. 123, Minute Entry
(documenting the request by Orton's counsel to temporarily strike the
scheduled trial dates for arbitration proceeding).
9

By discussing the analysis to be utilized in applying the ground
of manifest disregard of the law, the Utah Supreme Court implied that
it is a valid ground for vacating an arbitrator's award. See Utah
Code Ann. § 78-31a-14.
10

A good part of Orton's Brief is dedicated to arguing that
neither the district court nor this Court can reach the merits of the
17

Salt Lake

Trappers,

Inc.,

v. Swan,

346 U.S. 427, 436-37, 74 S. Ct. 182, 187 (1953)

925 P.2d 941, 951 (Utah 1996) (citing

interpretations of the law by the arbitrators [, ] in
manifest

disregard[,]

Wilko

("[T]he

contrast

to

are not subject . . . to judicial review for

error . . . ." (emphasis added)); Amicizia
& Iodine

Sales

Corp.,

Societa

Navegazione

v.

Chilean

Nitrate

1960).

"If arbitrators manifestly disregard the law in making their

274 F.2d 805, 808 (2nd Cir.

award, they can be said to have exceeded their authority.n11
also

Eljer

Manuf. , Inc.

v. Kowin Dev.

Corp.,

Id.-,

see

14 F.3d 1250, 1254 (7th

Cir. 1994) (stating that the arbitrator's decision will be set aside
"if in reaching his result, the arbitrator deliberately disregards
what he knows to be the law.") (citing Health
Hughes,

Servs.

975 F.2d 1253, 1267 (7th Cir. 1992); Jenkins

Mgmt.

Corp.

v.

v.

Prudential-

arbitrator1
s award. See Brief of Appellee, pp. 30-38. "Effusively
deferential language notwithstanding, the courts are neither entitled
nor encouraged simply to 'rubber stamp7 the interpretation and
decisions of arbitrator." Matteson
v. Ryder System Inc.,
99 F.3d 108
(3rd Cir. 1996) (citing Leed Architectural
Prods.,
Inc. v. United
Steelworkers
of Am., Local
6674,
916 F.2d 63, 65 (2nd Cir. 1990)
("this great deference, however, is not the equivalent of a grant of
limitless power"). "Courts still maintain a significant role in the
. arbitration process."
Id.
Moreover, "they have not been
relegated to the status of merely offering post-hoc sanction for the
action of arbitrators.
Rare though they may be, there will be
instances when it is appropriate for a court to vacate the decision
of an arbitrator." Xd. at 113-14. The instant case is one of them.
11

The district court's determination that the arbitrator did not
manifestly disregard the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing is a conclusion of law, which this Court reviews for
correctness. DeVore v. IHC Hosps.,
Inc.,
884 P.2d 1246, 1251 (Utah
1994).
18

Bache

Sec.

Inc.,

847 F.2d 631, 634 (10th Cir. 1988) (characterizing

the "manifest disregard" standard as "willful inattentiveness to the
governing law."); and Jeppson

v. Piper,

Jaffray

& Hopwood,

Inc.,

879

F.Supp. 1130, 1133 (D. Utah 1995) . According to the federal case law
address the issue,
Although the bounds of this ground have never been
defined, it clearly means more than error or
misunderstanding with respect to the law. The error
must have been obvious and capable of being readily
and instantly perceived by the average person
qualified to serve as an arbitrator. Moreover, the
term
"disregard"
implies
that
the
arbitrator
appreciates the existence of a clearly governing legal
principle but decides to ignore or pay no attention to
it.
Merrill

Lynch,

Pierce,

Fenner

& Smith

v.

Bobker,

808 F.2d 930, 933

(2nd Cir. 1986) (citations omitted).
In the instant case, the arbitrator, in his temporary or Interim
Arbitration Award, arrived at the following determination concerning
the claim that Pacific Development, L.C., was due a credit or offset
for Orton Excavation utilizing too much fill material on Plat C:
Pacific claims that it is entitled to a credit or
offset to the claims of Orton alleging that Orton used
too much imported material. The problem appears to be
inherent to the unit price contract that was entered
into by the parties.
Unit price contracts have
advantages and disadvantages. Pacific properly points
out that under a unit price contract Orton has no
incentive to be judicious in its use of material being
paid for by the unit. On the other hand, Pacific only
pays for what is actually used.
Pacific, however,
entered into the unit price type of contract.
If
Pacific wanted to exercise better control over the
useage [sic] of material its [sic] should have had a
representative (typically an engineer) on site to see
19

that material was being properly used.
During the
performance of much of the work in Plat B Pacific had
such a representative on site. During the performance
of work on Plat C Pacific had no such representative
on site.
The Arbitrator does not find that the
evidence supports a finding that Orton wasted
material.
There was evidence presented by Pacific
that more material was used in Plat C than maybe
Pacific thought should be used. Pacific, however, did
not meet its burden of proof on that issue.
The
computations by Fred Clark were general in nature
omitting some lengths of pipe installation, [sic]
assumed that Orton was responsible to cut the road for
rough grading, etc.
R. 187-88, Interim Arbitration Award, f22 . As previously mentioned,
Pacific

Development,

L.C.,

upon

receiving

and

reviewing

the

arbitrator's Interim Arbitration Award, objected by way of its Motion
for Reconsideration, arguing that Orton breached the implied duty of
good faith and fair dealing by utilizing over three times the amount
of fill material reasonably required to complete Plat C.
Motion for Reconsideration.

See R. 184,

In support, Pacific Development, L.C.,

cited various Utah cases setting forth and discussing the wellestablished implied duty of good faith and fair dealing.
Notwithstanding,

the

arbitrator

thereafter

issued

See

his

id.

Final

Arbitration Award, which included the identical paragraph 22 as that
previously set forth in the temporary Interim Arbitration Award.
140, Final Arbitration Award,

H22.

The arbitrator included the

following additional paragraph in the final award:
Pacific's Motion for Reconsideration is denied. The
Arbitrator heard the arguments during the course of
the proceeding that are being reargued by Pacific.
Pacific's argument is based largely upon its argument
20

R.

that Orton had within its scope of work the obligation
to perform the rough grading of the roadway.
The
Arbitrator specifically found that the contract did
not require that work to be done by Orton.
Orton

obviously

has a duty of good faith

and fair

dealing

with Pacific.
The Arbitrator, however, further found
that Pacific did not [sic] its burden of proof of its
allegation that Orton wasted material in Plat C.
See id.

at R. 138, ^25 (emphasis added).

By ruling in paragraph 22 of the Final Arbitration Award that
the problem

"appears to be inherent" in the unit price contract

entered into by the parties, and that if "Pacific wanted to exercise
better control over the useage [sic] of the material its [sic] should
have had a representative (typically an engineer) on site to see that
material

was

being

property

used",

the

arbitrator

manifestly

disregarded the well-established contract principle that each party
to a contract has an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
with the other party to the contract.
St.

Benedict's

Hosp.,

See St.

Benedict's

Dev.

Co.

v.

811 P.2d 194, 199 (Utah 1994).

By way of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, "each
party impliedly promises that he will not intentionally or purposely
do anything that will destroy or injure the other party's right to
receive the fruits of the contract."
Hills

Investment

Jennings,
Won-Door

& Land Co.,

Benedict's Dev.,

(citing Bastian

v.

Cedar

632 P.2d 818, 821 (Utah 1981); Ferris

595 P.2d 857 (Utah 1979)); see
Corp.,

Id.

also

Republic

Group,

Inc.

v.
v.

883 P.2d 285, 291 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (citing St.
811 P.2d at 199-200; Andalex

21

Resources,

Inc.,

871

P.2d

1041, 1047-48

(Utah Ct. App. 1994)).

"A violation of the

covenant gives rise to a claim for breach of contract."

Id.

The

covenant of good faith and fair dealing is especially applicable
where, as in the instant case, one party under the contract grants
the other party discretion to determine such terms as quantity,
See,

price, or time of performance.
National

Bank,

e.g.,

Cook

v.

Zions

First

919 P.2d 56 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).

Deliberate disregard of the law concerning the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing by the arbitrator is further demonstrated by
his

acknowledgment

that

the

parties

entered

into

a unit

price

contract and his detailed discussion of the inherent "problems" with
such contracts.

In direct contravention to this acknowledgment and

discussion, the arbitrator then ruled that

u

[i]f Pacific wanted to

exercise better control over the useage [sic] of material its [sic]
should have had a representative (typically an engineer) on site to
see

that material

was being property used."

In the course of

utilizing this as the basis for its ruling, the arbitrator not only
manifestly disregarded the principles of law regarding the implied
covenant of good faith and fair, but it implied a new term in the
unit contract entered into by the parties by requiring that Pacific
in fact hire an employee, i.e., an engineer, to monitor the fill
material utilized by Orton in the course of completing Plat C.
Hal

Taylor

Assocs.

v. Unionamerica,

Inc.,

See

657 P. 2d 743, 749 (Utah

1982) (holding that "this court will not rewrite a contract to supply
22

terms

which

the

parties

omitted.").

By

requiring

this,

the

arbitrator essentially relieved Orton of the duty to act both in good
faith and fairly with Pacific Development, L.C.12

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Pacific Development, L . C , respectfully
requests
Confirming

that
the

this

Court

reverse

Arbitrator's

Award

the

district

and

remand

court's
the

case

Order
with

instructions to vacate the arbitrator's award and to determine an
award of attorney fees and costs

for Pacific Development,

L.C,

incurred on appeal as well as the entry of any orders or proceedings
consistent with this Court's instructions set forth in its Opinion.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this O r ) day of May, 1999.
WIGGINS, P.C

Attorney,

12

Paragraph 2 5 of the Final Arbitration Award demonstrates that
the arbitrator appreciated the existence of the clearly governing
legal principle concerning the implied duty of good faith and fair
dealing but decided to ignore or pay no attention to it.
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ADDENDUM
No Addendum is necessary pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate
Procedure 24(a) (11) .
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